Oswald and Urwin: Written evidence to Commons Science and Technology Committee inquiry into algorithms in decision-making (April 2017) by Oswald, Marion & Urwin, Sheila
Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0 
Original source: 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/science-
and-technology-committee/algorithms-in-decisionmaking/written/69002.html  
Written evidence submitted by Marion Oswald, Senior Fellow in Law and Director of 
the Centre for Information Rights, University of Winchester, and Sheena Urwin, Head 
of Criminal Justice, Durham Constabulary (ALG0030)
Executive summary
 In the UK policing context, the use of algorithmic decision-making tools could be described 
as being in a developmental stage with implementation on a force by force basis;
 Such tools may be used in a number of different contexts, including decision-making or risk-
assessments relating to individuals;
 ‘Algorithms in Policing –Take ALGO-CARE™’ is a proposed decision-making framework for 
the deployment of algorithmic assessment tools in the policing context;
 Algo-care aims to translate key public law and human rights principles into practical 
considerations and guidance that can be addressed by public sector bodies;
 Concerns around transparency and accountability cannot be addressed by a one-size-fits-all 
approach;
 The factors identified by Algo-care necessitate the careful drafting of procurement contracts 
with third party software suppliers to require disclosure of algorithmic workings in a way 
that would facilitate investigation;
 A number of challenges remain to the satisfactory audit and validation of machine learning 
algorithmic tools.
Introduction
1. This submission summarises the output of a recent collaboration between the authors to reflect 
upon the deployment of an algorithmic tool within Durham Constabulary and the development of a 
general decision-making framework to guide users in the deployment of algorithmic tools in the 
policing context.  The submission also includes aspects of the corresponding author’s research into 
the use of algorithmic tools within policing, including a freedom of information based study.     
2. In this submission, we define an algorithm as a mathematical formula implemented by 
technology: ‘a sequence of instructions that are carried out to transform the input to the output.’ (Al 
Paydin, 2016)  We are concerned with machine learning whereby the computer learns and extracts 
the algorithm for the task from the given input data.  We do not comment on coded rules, 
programmed logic or database interrogation or linking.  
Extent of current and future use of algorithms in decision-making
3. This submission comments on the use of algorithmic decision-making tools within the policing and 
criminal justice context.  In the UK policing context, the use of algorithmic decision-making tools 
could be described as being in a developmental stage, with decisions on implementation being taken 
on a force by force basis.  As UK policing becomes more aware of the capability of such algorithmic 
tools in comparison to current practice, these types of tools can often be viewed as no more than 
modern decision support tools.
4. It has been suggested that there are currently three main purposes for algorithmic data or 
intelligence analysis within the policing context: i) predictive policing on a macro level incorporating 
strategic planning, prioritisation and forecasting; ii) operational intelligence linking and evaluation 
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which may include, for instance, crime reduction activities; and iii) decision-making or risk-
assessments relating to individuals. (Oswald, Grace, 2016)  
5. One UK force has been reported to be making substantive use of a predictive policing tool 
developed by the private sector (‘PredPol’, implemented by Kent Constabulary) in order to predict 
areas where offences are likely to take place.  A recent freedom of information-based study 
suggested a relatively small number of UK police forces (14%) were using computational or 
algorithmic data analysis or decision-making in relation to the analysis of intelligence, with tools 
stated to be used for all three of main purposes mentioned above. (Oswald, Grace, 2016)  
6. Durham Constabulary has developed an algorithmic risk-assessment tool in category iii) above 
(decision-making or risk-assessments relating to individuals).  The tool was developed by statistical 
experts based at the University of Cambridge in collaboration with the constabulary.  It has been 
developed to aid decision-making by custody officers when assessing the risk of future offending and 
to enable those suspects forecast as moderate risk to be eligible for the constabulary’s Checkpoint 
programme.  Checkpoint is an intervention currently being tested in the constabulary and is an out 
of court disposal aimed at reducing future offending.  
7. The Durham tool uses the ‘random forest’ method, a machine learning algorithm that uses many 
independent decision-trees with random selections of data as training and the combined result (the 
forest) for the forecast.  It has thirty-four ‘predictors’, the majority of which relate to the suspect’s 
previous offending behaviour together with age, gender, residential postcode, and number of 
intelligence reports.  The tool does not currently access data held on the Police National Computer 
or Police National Database, or indeed other information contained in police systems such as 
incidents or the content of intelligence reports for example.  The model has been designed to 
overestimate the risk using a precautionary approach and so minimise the numbers of false 
negatives (where an offender was forecasted low risk but was actually high risk of committing a 
serious offence) which are regarded as the most dangerous scenarios. (Please also see the parallel 
submission relating to the Checkpoint programme and the development of the related algorithmic 
tool).
8. It is understood that other UK forces are considering the development of similar tools, although 
this may be in connection with different programmes or contexts, with potential for such tools to be 
implemented to prioritise investigative actions or where the police have to decide whether to supply 
public protection risk information, based on an actuarial judgement (such as 'Clare’s Law').  For 
schemes where difficult risk-based judgements are required, a fair and trustworthy algorithmic 
decision-making tool may potentially be helpful, provided not used in a determinative way.  
9. In the USA, algorithmic tools have been introduced that are used to feed more directly into 
immediate decisions or judgements about individuals. One such tool was introduced in Chicago to 
predict those individuals who are likely to be involved in gun violence, and software developed by a 
company called Northpointe is being used to assess recidivism risk and thus inform parole and 
sentencing decisions.  Northpointe states that its formula includes factors such as whether the 
defendant has a job and their education levels, but that the specific calculations are proprietary. In 
the USA, algorithmic risk assessment tools were initially used only by probation and parole 
departments but have now expanded to bail hearings and sentencing (Barnes et al., 2012).  
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10. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has recently ruled on the challenge by convicted criminal Eric 
Loomis to the use of Northpoint’s algorithmic risk assessment tool called ‘COMPAS’ during his 
sentencing.  Although Loomis ultimately failed in his challenge, the court held that the tool should be 
subject to a number of cautions that a court should take into account as follows:
 the proprietary nature of COMPAS prevents disclosure of information relating to how factors 
are weighed or risk scores are determined;
 the scores are based on group data, and so are not able to identify a particular high-risk 
individual;
 concerns have been raised about disproportionate classification of ethnic minority offenders 
as high risk;
 the scores are based on a national sample; there had been no cross-validation for a 
regional/State sample;
 COMPAS was not developed for use at sentencing.
11. The above factors identified by the Wisconsin Supreme Courts usefully highlight a number of the 
risks and concerns generated by the use of algorithmic tools in the policing context, particularly 
where individuals may be impacted on a micro level.  The following section sets out proposals for a 
framework by which key concerns can be addressed both before and during the deployment of an 
algorithmic decision-making tool. 
‘Good practice’ in algorithmic decision-making
12. This section sets out a proposed decision-making framework for the deployment of algorithmic 
assessment tools in the policing context developed by the corresponding author in collaboration 
with Durham Constabulary.  The framework – ‘Algorithms in Policing –Take ALGO-CARE™’ - reflects 
the experience of Durham Constabulary in developing and rolling out its algorithm associated with 
the Checkpoint programme.  It also aims to translate key public law and human rights principles into 
practical considerations and guidance that can be addressed by public sector bodies.  
13. While the authors note that a number of organisations are developing, or advocate developing, 
other high level principles in respect of algorithms and A.I. (which can be helpful to represent ethical 
norms and in setting a general direction of travel), we would submit that they often do not provide 
enough practical certainty for the development of administrative and assessment frameworks (or for 
practitioners to refer to in their day-to-day work).  Algo-care aims to address these concerns, and to 
provide a decision-making framework that could work in different policing contexts, and potentially 
more widely across the public sector.  
14. The current working version of ‘Algorithms in Policing –Take ALGO-CARE™’ is set out in Fig. 1 
below, together with additional explanatory notes (Fig. 2).  It is also set out in JPEG format in 
Appendix 1.  Each word in the mnemonic – Advisory; Lawful; Granularity; Ownership; Challengeable; 
Accuracy; Responsible; Explainable – is supplemented by questions and considerations representing 
key legal considerations (such as necessity and proportionality, natural justice and procedural 
fairness), as well as practical concerns such as intellectual property ownership and the availability of 
an ‘expert witness’ to the tool’s functionality.  The framework could be used in parallel with 
privacy/equality impact assessments.
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Fig. 1
Algorithms in Policing – Take ALGO-CARE™
A proposed decision-making framework for the deployment of algorithmic assessment tools in the 
policing context
A Advisory Is the assessment made by the algorithm used in an advisory capacity?  Does 
a human officer retain decision-making discretion? What other decision-
making by human officers will add objectivity to the decisions (partly) based 
on the algorithm?
L Lawful On a case-by-case basis, what is the policing purpose justifying the use of 
algorithm, both its means and ends? Is the potential interference with the 
privacy of individuals necessary and proportionate for legitimate policing 
purposes?  In what way will the tool improve the current system and is this 
demonstrable? Are the data processed by the algorithm lawfully obtained, 
processed and retained, according to a genuine necessity with a rational 
connection to a policing aim?  Is the operation of the tool compliant with 
national guidance?
G Granularity Does the algorithm make suggestions at the right level of detail/granularity, 
given the purpose of the algorithm and the nature of the data processed?  
Do the benefits outweigh any technological or data quality uncertainties or 
gaps?  Is the provenance and quality of the data sufficiently sound?  
Consider how often the data should be refreshed. If the tool takes a 
precautionary approach towards false negatives, consider the justifications 
for this.
O Ownership Who owns the algorithm and the data analysed?  Does the force need rights 
to access, use and amend the source code and data analysed?  How will the 
tool be maintained and updated? Are there any contractual or other 
restrictions which might limit accountability or evaluation?  How is the 
operation of the algorithm kept secure?
C Challengeable What are the post-implementation oversight and audit mechanisms e.g. to 
identify any bias? Where an algorithmic tool informs criminal justice 
disposals, how are individuals notified of its use (as appropriate in the 
context of the tool’s operation and purpose)?
A Accuracy Does the specification match the policing aim and decision policy? Can the 
stated accuracy of the algorithm be validated reasonably periodically?  Can 
the percentage of false positives/negatives be justified? How was this 
method chosen as opposed to other available methods?  What are the 
consequences of inaccurate forecasts?  Does this represent an acceptable 
risk (in terms of both likelihood and impact)?  Is the algorithmic tool 
deployed by those with appropriate expertise?
R Responsible Would the operation of the algorithm be considered fair?  Is the use of the 
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algorithm transparent (taking account of the context of its use), accountable 
and placed under review alongside other IT developments in policing?
Would it be considered to be for the public interest and ethical?
E Explainable Is appropriate information available about the decision-making rule(s) and 
the impact that each factor has on the final score or outcome (in a similar 
way to a gravity matrix)? Is the force able to access and deploy a data 
science expert to explain and justify the algorithmic tool (in a similar way to 
an expert forensic pathologist)?
Fig. 2
Brief explanatory notes and additional considerations
The Algorithms in Policing – Take ALGO-CARE ™ framework is intended to provide guidance for the 
use of risk-assessment, predictive, forecasting, classification, decision-making and assistive 
policing tools which incorporate algorithmic machine learning methods and which may impact 
individuals on a micro or macro level
A Advisory Care should be taken to ensure that an algorithm is not inappropriately 
fettering an officer’s discretion, as natural justice and procedural fairness 
claims may well arise.  Consider if supposedly advisory algorithmic 
assessments are in practice having undue influence.  If it is proposed that an 
algorithmic decision be automated and determinative, is this justified by the 
factors below?  Data protection rights in regard to automated decisions may 
then apply.
L Lawful The algorithm’s proposed functions, application, individual effect and use of 
datasets (police-held data and third party data) should be considered against 
necessity, proportionality and data minimisation principles, in order to 
inform a ‘go/no-go’ decision. In relation to tools that may inform criminal 
justice disposals, regard should be given to the duty to give reasons.
G Granularity Consideration should be given to common problems in data analysis, such as 
those relating to the meaning of data, compatibility of data from disparate 
sources, missing data and inferencing.  Do forces know how much averaging 
or blurring has already been applied to inputs (e.g. postcode area averages)?
O Ownership Consider intellectual property ownership, maintenance of the tool and 
whether open source algorithms should be the default. When drafting 
procurement contracts with third party software suppliers (commercial or 
academic), require disclosure of the algorithmic workings in a way that 
would facilitate investigation by a third party in an adversarial context if 
necessary. Ensure the force has appropriate rights to use, amend and 
disclose the tool and any third party data. Require the supplier to provide an 
‘expert’ witness/evidence of the tool’s operation if required by the force.
C Challengeable The results of the analysis should be applied in the context of appropriate 
professional codes and regulations.  Consider whether the application of the 
algorithm requires information to be given to the individual and/or legal 
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advisor.  Regular validation and recalibration of the system should be based 
on publicly observable (unless non-disclosable for policing/national security 
reasons) scoring rules.
A Accuracy How are results checked for accuracy, and how is historic accuracy fed back 
into the algorithm for the future?  Can forces understand how inaccurate or 
out-of-date input data affects the result?
R Responsible It is recommended that ethical considerations, such as consideration of the 
public good and moral principles (so spanning wider concerns than legal 
compliance) are factored into the deployment decision-making process.  
Administrative arrangements such as an ethical review committee 
incorporating independent members could be established for such a 
purpose (such as Cleveland & Durham Joint External Ethics Committee or 
NSDEC).
E Explainable The latest methods of interpretable and accountable machine learning 
systems should be considered and incorporated into the specification as 
appropriate.  This is particularly important if considering deployment of 
‘black box’ algorithms, where inputs and outputs are viewable but internal 
workings are opaque (the rule emerges from the data analysis undertaken).  
Has the relevant Policing & Crime Commissioner been briefed appropriately?
Transparency, accountability and commercial confidentiality
15. The authors would suggest that concerns around transparency and accountability cannot be 
addressed in a one-size-fits-all way.  It would not be appropriate, for instance, for the functionality 
of a tool used in the investigative process to be ‘transparent’ in the sense of the detailed 
functionality being publicly available.  Where a tool assists in the decision-making about an out-of-
court disposal, however, information about its use should be made available to the affected 
individual and/or his legal adviser (to address Article 6/right to a fair hearing concerns). 
16. Algo-care identifies that, at the very least, the public body should be able to explain the decision-
making rule(s) and the impact that each factor has on the final score or outcome, and ensure that it 
has access to and can deploy a data science expert to explain and justify the algorithmic tool (in a 
similar way to an expert forensic pathologist).  The framework also notes that development 
specifications should incorporate as appropriate the latest methods of interpretable, interactive and 
accountable machine learning systems (see for instance Kroll et al., 2017).
17. These factors necessitate the careful drafting of procurement contracts with third party software 
suppliers (commercial or academic).  Contracts should require disclosure of the algorithmic workings 
in a way that would facilitate investigation by a third party in an adversarial context if necessary (and 
the provision of an expert witness/evidence of the tool’s operation).  In addition to appropriate 
rights to use, amend and disclose the software tool, public sector bodies should pay attention to 
rights over any third party data that have been used as inputs, such as mosaic postcodes.  Although 
Algo-care identifies that open source software as default should be considered, it is appreciated that 
Written evidence submitted by Marion Oswald, Senior Fellow in Law and Director of 
the Centre for Information Rights, University of Winchester, and Sheena Urwin, Head 
of Criminal Justice, Durham Constabulary (ALG0030)
access to the source code does not necessarily, of itself, result in an appropriately understandable 
and challengeable tool.  Such access could however aid validation exercises for accuracy and bias.  
18. The Wisconsin court in Loomis dismissed the argument that unless he could review how the 
factors are weighed and how risk scores are determined by the tool, the accuracy of the assessment 
cannot be verified.  The court stated:
‘Although Loomis cannot review and challenge how the COMPAS algorithm calculates risk, 
he can at least review and challenge the resulting risk scores set forth in the report.’
19. The corresponding author has previously argued that it seems unlikely that the UK Supreme 
Court would allow the secret workings of a proprietary risk-assessment algorithm to form part of a 
court’s sentencing deliberation as the Wisconsin Supreme Court has done (Oswald, Grace, 2016).  As 
the Doody decision held that a Home Secretary must show ‘how his mind is working’ in setting the 
tariff for life sentence prisoners, the same is likely to be true of an algorithm working in a similar 
context.  Where risk-based decisions have an immediate and direct impact upon individuals, again it 
seems unlikely that commercial confidentiality would be permitted to be a barrier to appropriate 
scrutiny.
Audit and validation
20. The Algo-care framework identifies the need for regular audit and validation of the chosen 
model in terms of accuracy and in order to identify any bias or discrimination.  The Durham model 
has highlighted the difficulties of validating situations where there is a significant discrepancy 
between the assessments i.e. the custody officer  assesses 'high', the algorithm 'low' or vice versa.  If 
the decision in these cases is always to act upon the high risk assessment, it will then be difficult to 
assess accuracy if the individual receives a custodial sentence (so during that period they cannot 
reoffend).  (A recent US paper which compares an algorithm to bail decisions by judges suggests 
inputting outcomes for jailed defendants using outcomes of offenders with similar observables who 
the more lenient judge released: Kleinberg et al., 2017).
Advisory 
21. The very nature of these tools means that an individual is being compared to the past behaviour 
of others with a similar profile.  Using home address, for instance, has been criticised by Cathy O'Neil 
in her book 'Weapons of Math Destruction' for assuming that people in dangerous neighbourhoods 
are 'birds of a feather'.  As Alpaydin comments, ‘there are always other factors that affect the 
output; we cannot possibly record and take all of them as input, and all these other factors that we 
neglect introduce uncertainty.’  This is why Algo-care emphasises that, from a public law 
perspective, an algorithmic tool should not fetter a police officer’s discretion.  The custody officer 
should, both in theory and in practice, be able to override the algorithm’s assessment where other 
factors suggest a different outcome.  The overall decision-making process should ensure that those 
factors that led the human decision-making to override the algorithm are documented fully.   
Regulatory oversight of algorithmic decision-making
22. The Algo-care framework recommends that ethical considerations, such as consideration of the 
public good and moral principles are factored into the deployment decision-making process.  
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Administrative arrangements such as an ethical review committee incorporating independent 
members could be established for such a purpose (such as Cleveland & Durham Joint External Ethics 
Committee or National Statistician’s Data Ethics Advisory Committee).  
23. To keep in line with the likely expansion of the use of algorithmic tools within policing, it is also 
suggested that national guidance be developed by the College of Policing, overseen by HMIC.
April 2017
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